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Abstract: 
Partnerships between universities and industrial firms can play a key role in enhancing 
competitiveness because they provide a conduit for the spillover of knowledge from the 
academic organization where knowledge is created to the firm where it is transformed into 
innovative activity. We set forth in this paper a model of industry/university participation, and 
we test the model empirically, using research project data on entrepreneurial firms that were 
funded through the US Department of Energy's Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) 
program. We find that larger firms are more likely to be involved in a research partnership with a 
university, in general, as are firms with founders who have an academic background. We find the 
latter result holds across disaggregated types of university partnerships, as well. We find no 
empirical evidence that the size of the SBIR award influences the likelihood of a research 
partnership. 
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1. Introduction 
The issue of competitiveness has emerged as one of the great policy concerns confronting the 
USA. The inability of the country to be competitive in traditional manufacturing industries as 
well as emerging high technology industries has been linked to higher rates of unemployment 
and lower rates of economic growth.1 A key issue in enhancing American competitiveness is to 
generate more innovative activity from investments in science and technology. Partnerships 
between universities and industrial firms can play a key role because they provide a conduit for 
the spillover of knowledge from the academic organization where knowledge is created to the 
firm where it is transformed into innovative activity, which ultimately enhances the 
competitiveness of the firm, industry, and country.† 2 
The Council on Competitiveness (1996, 3–4) emphasized more than a decade and a half ago the 
importance of industry/university relationships in the USA: 
[P]articipants in the U.S. R&D enterprise will have to continue experimenting with 
different types of partnerships to respond to the economic constraints, competitive 
pressures and technological demands that are forcing adjustments across the board. … 
[and in response] industry is increasingly relying on partnerships with universities … 
A number of academic studies support this claim as well.3 For example, Link (1996) showed 
that university participation in formal research joint ventures (RJVs) has increased steadily since 
the mid-1980s, Cohen et al. (1998) documented that the number of industry/university R&D 
centers increased by more than 60% during the 1980s, and a related survey of US science faculty 
by Morgan (1998) revealed that many desire even more partnership relationships with industry. 
Mowery and Teece (1996, 111) argue that such growth in strategic alliances in R&D is indicative 
of a ‘broad restructuring of the US national R&D system’. The findings of these studies are 
consistent with the view that partnerships between industry and universities are conducive to 
knowledge spillovers that promote innovative activity and ultimately enhance competitiveness. 
According to Hall, Link, and Scott (2000, 2003), little is known about the types of roles that 
universities play in such research partnerships or about the economic consequences associated 
with those roles.4 What research there is on the topic of universities as research partners falls 
broadly into either examinations of industry motivations or university motivations for engaging 
in an industry/university research relationship.5 
Hall, Link, and Scott (2000, 2003) noted that the literature has identified two broad industry 
motivations for engaging in an industry/university research relationship. The first is access to 
complementary research activity and research results.6 Rosenberg and Nelson (1994, 340) 
emphasized: ‘What university research most often does today is to stimulate and enhance the 
power of R&D done in industry, as contrasted with providing a substitute for it’. Pavitt (1998), 
based on his review of this literature, was more specific in this regard. He concluded that 
academic research augments the capacity of businesses to solve complex problems. The second 
industry motivation is access to key university personnel.7 A third motivation might be that 
through a university relationship, the firm can expand its boundaries while at the same time 
eliminating market transactions for research services. Following Coase (1937, 388), it might be 
the case that university-based research services are an example of the ‘entrepreneur-co-ordinator’ 
who, through the partnership, is able to direct research without the complications of a market 
with exchange transactions. 
University motivations for partnering with industry seem to be financially based. Administration-
based financial pressures for faculty to engage in applied commercial research with industry are 
growing.8 Zeckhauser (1996, 12746), for example, was subtle when he referred to the supposed 
importance of industry-supported research to universities as he describes how such relationships 
might develop: ‘Information gifts [to industry] may be a part of [a university's] commercial 
courtship ritual’. Along those same lines, Cohen et al. (1997, 177) argued that:9 ‘University 
administrators appear to be interested chiefly in the revenue generated by relationships with 
industry’. They are also of the opinion that faculty, who are fundamental to making such 
relationships work: ‘… desire support, per se, because it contributes to their personal incomes 
[and] eminence … primarily through foundation research that provides the building blocks for 
other research and therefore tends to be widely cited’. 
However, several drawbacks to university involvement with industry have been identified, such 
as the diversion of faculty time and effort from teaching, the conflict between industrial trade 
secrecy and traditional academic openness, and the distorting effect of industry funding on the 
university budget allocation process (in particular, the tension induced when the distribution of 
resources is vastly unequal across departments and schools). 
Empirical research related to universities as research partners, as recently summarized by Link 
and Wessner (2011), does so by drawing on the industrial organization paradigm developed by 
Bain (1949). Defining ‘conduct’ as partnering with a university and ‘structure’ as those firms or 
universities or environmental characteristics that bring about partnering, then the structure → 
conduct literature can be summarized as follows. Partnering (i.e. conduct) is more likely in the 
following independent situations (i.e. structure): the firm is engaged in exploratory internal R&D 
(Bercovitz and Feldman 2007); the firm is mature and large (Fontana, Geuna, and Matt 2006; 
Stuart, Ozdemir, and Ding 2007); there is a lack of intellectual property issues between the firm 
and the university (Hall 2004; Hall, Link, and Scott 2001); and university faculty are male, with 
tenure, and are part of a university research center (Link, Siegel, and Bozeman 2007; Boardman 
and Corley 2008). Defining performance in terms of the economic consequences of partnering 
with a university, then the  conduct → performance literature can be summarized as follows: 
there will be two-way flows of knowledge through publication and conferences, and through the 
formation of RJVs (Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh 2002; Link 2005; Link and Scott 2005; Hertzfeld, 
Link, and Vonortas 2006); firm R&D will be more successful (Link and Rees 1990; Hall, Link, 
and Scott 2000, 2003; Kodama 2008); and university research parks – literally a university-based 
manifestation – will grow as will attendant industries (Link and Scott 2007; Bozeman, Hardin, 
and Link 2008). 
The remainder of this paper is outlined as follows. In Section 2, we set forth a model of 
industry/university participation. In Section 3, we test this model by developing a reduced form 
equation of the probability that a firm will partner with a university on a specific research 
project. Our data for this empirical test comes from projects funded by the US Department of 
Energy's (DOE's) Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program. Finally, in Section 4, we 
conclude the paper with summary remarks. 
2. Model of the industry/university participation 
When firms initiate a research partnership with a university, or when a university initiates a 
research partnership with a firm, each is acting entrepreneurially as it systematically and 
purposely attempts to identify, or explore, and capture a new source of supply – knowledge. For 
the firm, this new source of supply is knowledge that the university has (or can generate), but 
that the firm cannot acquire easily (i.e. at low cost) on its own; for the university, this new source 
of supply is finances that the firm has, but that the university cannot easily (i.e. at low cost) 
acquire on its own. Each uses, or exploits, systematically and purposely this new source of 
supply to create jointly, among other things, a new method of production, be it a good or service/ 
intellectual output. That new method of production can lead to a new market or organization of 
industry.10 
The degree to which a firm will engage with a university in an innovation process is a two-step 
decision process in which the firm first decides whether to establish a relationship, and second 
what level of involvement it will have assuming it has already decided to establish a relationship. 
Consider the second decision first. The value of working with a university is twofold. It increases 
the probability that the innovation process will be successful, and it increases the value of any 
innovation that might result. Letting the level of involvement with the university be represented 
by Q, where Q might be thought of empirically as R&D inputs, the probability that the 
innovation process results in a marketable product can be represented by the concave function 
p(Q) and the revenues (net of production costs) associated with the production and sale of the 
resulting innovation can be represented by the concave function R(q) where q indicates the 
quality/marketability of the innovation.11 The quality q of the innovation is itself assumed to be 
a concave function q(Q) of the level Q of involvement with the university. Thus, expected net 
revenues from the production and sale of the resulting innovation will be: 
 
and expected marginal net revenues associated with the production and sale of the innovation 
will be 
 
There are, of course, costs to engaging in the R&D process itself, both in terms of the physical 
and intellectual effort required as well as in terms of the costs of raising the funds to be able to 
make such effort.12 Assuming that these costs include both fixed and variable components, we 
can represent the cost function by the function: 
 
The optimal level of university involvement, assuming the firm wishes to maximize the expected 
profits from engaging in an R&D process, will be some Q* that maximizes the expected profits 
associated with the R&D process: 
 
that is, Q* will be that level of Q that equates expected marginal revenue, MR e , to the marginal 
cost, MC, of the R&D process: 
 
Figure 1 provides a graphical illustration of the determination of the optimal level of 
involvement with the university. 
 
Figure 1. Determining the level of involvement with a university. 
Of course, the above analysis is based on the assumption that the firm in fact chooses to work 
with the university. Unlike the decision as to how large Q should be, the decision whether to 
engage with the university is a discrete one in which the firm chooses from among three 
possibilities: partner with a university, perform the R&D in-house, or not engage in R&D. 
Following Coase's (1937) analysis on the boundaries of a firm, the decision to partner with a 
university requires that the expected profits associated with that partnership, , be at 
least as great as the expected profits associated with performing the R&D in-house, . 
Thus, a necessary condition for partnering with a university is that: 
 
level of expected profits associated with a university partnership, , will depend on the 
nature of the partnership. To better understand the factors that will affect the value of a 
university partnership, note that those expected profits can be defined as the area between the 
MR e curve and the MC curve in Figure 1 (minus, of course, the fixed costs associated with the 
R&D process), that is 
 
Thus, the level of these profits will depend on the degree to which the following factors are part 
of a university partnership:13 
• University provision of human and/or physical capital that the firm otherwise would not 
have access to. To the extent, this is true, the partnership will relax a resource constraint 
of the firm, thus resulting in the MC curve being further to the right (and perhaps 
vertically lower) that it would be otherwise. This results in a higher level of 
engagement, Q*, a higher level of expected profits, π e (Q*), and therefore a greater 
probability that a university partnership will meet the necessary condition described in 
Equation 6. 
• The presence of the partnership reduces the cost of raising capital to fund the R&D 
process. This cost in large part will be determined by the degree to which the firm can 
fund the R&D project internally versus externally, by the perceived riskiness of the 
R&D process by financial markets, and by the perceived market value of the resulting 
innovation. A lower cost of raising capital will mean that the MC curve is vertically 
lower. To the extent that this occurs, the level of engagement Q* with the university will 
be higher, the level of expected profits π e (Q*) will be greater, and therefore there will 
be a greater probability that a university partnership will meet the necessary condition 
described in Equation (6). 
• Engagement with the university results in a transfer of knowledge (such as an increase 
in the absorptive capacity of the firm) and/or skills to the firm. To the extent this is 
present in university partnership, the MR e curve and/or the MC curve will be further to 
the right than they otherwise would be. This results in a greater level of engagement Q* 
with the university, an increase in expected profits π e (Q*), and therefore a greater 
probability that a university partnership will meet the necessary condition described 
in Equation (6). 
• University partnership results in a reduced ability by the firm to appropriate the 
benefits of the R&D process. Such a characteristic of a university partnership may be 
due to the more open research environment that universities operate in. To the extent 
this factor is present, the MR e curve would be further to the left than it otherwise would 
be. That results in a lower level of engagement Q*, lower expected profits π e (Q*), and 
therefore a diminished likelihood that the necessary condition in Equation (6) is met. 
Figure 2 summarizes this choice problem by illustrating two cases, the first of which (defined by 
the expected profit function  is associated with the firm deciding to engage with the 
university, the second of which (defined by the expected profit function  results in the 
firm deciding not to engage with the university. 
 
Figure 2. The decision to engage with a university. 
Finally, note that these results are based on the assumption that the firm seeks to maximize the 
profits associated with the R&D process. However, experiments by Fehr, Herz, and Wilkening 
(2010) based on a theoretical principal-agent model by Aghion and Tirole (1997) find that 
principals tend to value control in the decision-making process independent of the level of profit 
and therefore are willing to pay a premium (in the form of foregone profits) to preserve that 
control. In the context of this paper, this suggests that firms may insist on a higher, strictly 
positive threshold of profitability before deciding to partner with a university. To the extent this 
is true, the condition for partnering with a university would become: 
 
where ρ represents the value that firm places on maintaining control of the R&D process rather 
than delegating its authority to a university. As Fehr, Herz, and Wilkening (2010) note, the 
likelihood that the principal will delegate authority to an agent will increase, the greater the 
principal perceives that its interests coincide with the interests of the agent or the more the agent 
has expertise/knowledge that the principal does not have. In the context of this paper, that 
suggests that the presence of specialized university knowledge and/or a greater comfort level on 
the part of the firm with engaging with a university, the smaller will be ρ, and therefore the 
greater the likelihood that the firm decides to partner with the university. 
3. Statistical analysis 
Our empirical model focuses on identifying those factors that play a role in the discrete choice 
problem of whether to partner with a university. We define our empirical model to be 
 
where Univ is a dichotomous representation of whether a firm partners with a university on a 
particular research project, X is a vector of project characteristics, and Z is a vector of firm 
characteristics. Following the theoretical discussion above, we seek variables for X and Z that 
are associated with changes in the firm's expected marginal revenue, its marginal cost, and/or its 
expectation that its interests coincide with those of a university. 
3.2 SBIR database 
The SBIR program was created in 1982 under the US Small Business Innovation Development 
Act of 1982 with the following stated objectives: to stimulate technological innovation, to use 
small business to meet Federal research and development needs, to foster and encourage 
participation by minority and disadvantaged persons in technological innovation, and to increase 
private sector commercialization of innovations derived from Federal research and development 
(R&D).14 The 1992 reauthorization of the program broadened the above objectives to emphasize 
the participation of woman owned and controlled businesses. 
Each government agency with an extramural research budget is required to set aside a portion 
(currently equal to 2.5%) of that budget to award to small (500 or fewer employees) US 
businesses (at least 51% owned by US citizens or lawfully admitted permanent resident aliens) in 
response to requests for proposals on defined topics. The structure of the SBIR program is 
defined by three phases: Phase I has awards to assist businesses as they assess the feasibility of 
an idea's scientific and commercial potential in response to the funding agency's objectives; 
currently these are 6-month awards for up to $100,000. Phase II has awards to assist businesses 
further their research with an expectation that the resulting technology will be commercialized; 
currently these are two-year awards for up to $1,000,000. There are no agency awards in Phase 
III; it is the period of time when the funded businesses are to move their technology from the 
laboratory into the market place. The business is expected to find private-sector funding (e.g. 
from venture capitalists) during this period. 
Eleven agencies currently participate in the SBIR program, with the Department of Defense 
(DoD) accounting for nearly 58% of all awards, followed by Health and Human Services’ 
National Institutes of Health (NIH) with about 19%, and DOE with about 6% (along with the 
National Aeronautics and Space administration and the National Science Foundation with similar 
percentages). Currently, about $2 billion is allocated per year to Phase I and Phase II awards, 
with nearly 98% account for the contribution by these five agencies. 
As part of the SBIR program's reauthorization in 2000, the US Congress charged the National 
Research Council (NRC) within the National Academies to make recommendations for 
improvements in the program. Among those evaluatory activities that the NRC undertook was an 
extensive and balanced survey in 2005 based on a population of 11,214 projects completed from 
Phase II awards during the 1992–2001 time period. DOE Phase II projects in this database are 
studied herein. 
Although not the largest agency participating in the SBIR program, there are some compelling 
reasons for focusing on DOE for this study. First, businesses that are funded through DoD and 
are successful in completing Phase II have a captive audience for much of their resulting 
technology, namely DoD (Nelson 1982; Link and Scott 2009). In 2005, the year of the NRC 
survey, nearly 40% of the technology developed by businesses through DoD Phase II awards 
was sold to that agency. Thus, the behavior of those businesses, especially their behavior toward 
partnering with universities is not guided entirely by market pressures. Second, NIH is 
comprised of 27 research institutes and centers, but there is a great amount of heterogeneity 
among Phase II award recipients because of heterogeneity of the Institute's focus (Link and 
Ruhm 2009). In our opinion, businesses funded by Phase II awards from DOE are more likely to 
have market-based incentives for creating new technologies and commercializing them, and thus 
relying strategically on universities as a source of technical knowledge and technology (National 
Research Council 2008). See Table 1 for descriptive statistics on the DOE sample of Phase II 
awards. 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics on the NRC survey of DOE Phase II awards, 1992–2001. 
Data reduction        Number of Phase II projects 
Completed Phase II projects      808 
Phase II survey sample size      439 
Phase II random survey sample sizea     436 
Response to the random survey (percent)    154 (35.3%) 
Projects uses herein based on responses to all survey questions 92 
a The NRC surveyed a number of non-randomly chosen projects (n=3) so as to be able to 
emphasize pre-selected success examples (National Research Council 2008). 
3.3 Specification of the model 
The variables used to estimate versions of Equation (8) are defined in Table 2, and descriptive 
statistics are presented in Table 3. 
Table 2. Definition of variables. 
Variable Definition 
Dependent variable 
Univ  =1 if in executing the Phase II research project there was involvement by a 
university 
UnivFaculty =1 if faculty member(s) or adjunct member(s) worked on the Phase II research 
project as a consultant 
UnivGA =1 if graduate student(s) worked on the Phase II research project 
UnivEqupt =1 if university facilities and/or equipment were used on the Phase II research 
project 
UnivSub =1 if a university was a subcontractor on the Phase II research project 
UnivLicense =1 if the technology for the Phase II project was licensed from a university 
UnivDevelop =1 if the technology for the Phase II project was developed at a university by a 
participant in the Phase II research project 
Independent project variable 
Award Phase II award amount ($1000) 
FemalePI =1 if the PI on the Phase II project was a female 
Software =1 if the actual/expected commercialized output is software 
Hardware =1 if the actual/expected commercialized output is hardware 
ProcessTech =1 if the actual/expected commercialized output is a process technology 
ServiceCapab =1 if the actual/expected commercialized output is service capability 
Tool  =1 if the actual/expected commercialized output is a research tool 
EducMat =1 if the actual/expected commercialized output is educational material 
Other  =1 if the actual/expected commercialized output is other than listed above 
Independent firm variable 
Bus  =1 if a founder of the firm has a business background 
Acad  =1 if a founder of the firm has an academic background 
Emp  Employment in the firm at the time of the Phase II award 
FemaleOwn =1 if the firm is owned by a female 
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics on the variables (n=92). 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Range 
Dependent variable 
Univ  0.348 0.479 0/1 
UnivFaculty 0.185 0.390 0/1 
UnivGA 0.217 0.415 0/1 
UnivEqupt 0.120 0.326 0/1 
UnivSub 0.130 0.339 0/1 
UnivLicense 0.022 0.147 0/1 
UnivDevelop 0.054 0.228 0/1 
Independent project variable 
Award  688.60 96.96 387.29–750.00 
FemalePI       
Software 0.217 0.415 0/1 
Hardware 0.565 0.498 0/1 
ProcessTech 0.337 0.475 0/1 
ServiceCapab 0.207 0.407 0/1 
Tool  0.130 0.339 0/1 
EducMat 0.043 0.205 0/1 
Other  0.076 0.267 0/1 
Independent firm variable 
Bus  0.446 0.450 0/1 
Acad  0.587 0.495 0/1 
Emp  23.84 38.69 0–200 
FemaleOwn 0.043 0.205 0/1 
We consider seven dependent variables in the estimation of Equation (8), although our focal 
dependent variable is Univ (Table 2). This variable measures dichotomously whether an SBIR 
award-recipient firm partnered with a university in any manner while executing its funded Phase 
II research project. In our sample of 92 funded and completed Phase II projects (Table 1), nearly 
35% had a university relationship (Table 3). 
The remaining six non-mutually independent university variables measure dichotomously the 
type of university relationship and allow us indirectly to obtain a fuller indication of the 
motivations for partnering with a university, particularly with regard to whether universities 
provide specialized inputs that are not readily or otherwise available to the firm.15 Most 
commonly (Table 3), firms are involved with a university through the use of graduate students 
(UnivGA); nearly 22% of the Phase II research projects employed graduate students. The less 
frequent relationships are when the Phase II research relies on a technology developed at the 
university by a participant in the Phase II project – this occurs only about 5% of the time – or a 
technology licensed from the university – this occurs about 2% of the time. 
The dependent variables reflect the propensity for the university to be involved in SBIR Phase II 
research projects in a variety of ways. Alvarez, Barney, and Young (2010), Eckhardt and Shane 
(2010), and Sarasvathy et al. (2010) stress the roles that the recognition of entrepreneurial 
opportunity plays in the decision by individuals to undertake entrepreneurial activity. There are 
three categories of available variables that influence either the existence of entrepreneurial 
opportunities or the ability of the firms to recognize that such entrepreneurial opportunities are 
associated with university–firm partnerships. 
The first category of independent variables reflects characteristics specific to SBIR Phase II 
award project. Regarding project characteristics, the level of Phase II funding (Award) will affect 
the firm's decision to partner in two ways. First, the greater the level of Phase II funding the 
greater will be the firm's access to human and/or physical capital. Second, the greater the level of 
Phase II funding, the lower the cost of raising capital to fund the R&D process will be. The 
difficulty in predicting the result of these effects is that they argue for increased profits for the 
firm whether it partners with the university or not. Thus, in terms of Figure 2, both the π e (Q) 
curve and the  line will shift up, and thus the likelihood of partnering with the university could 
increase or decrease, depending on the relative degree to which π e (Q) and  line increase. It 
should be noted, however, that if the firm chooses to partner with the university, the larger the 
level of Phase II funding, the greater will be the level of involvement with the university Q* due 
to the large level of funding shifting the firm's marginal cost curve down and to the right. 
A second independent variable indicates whether the PI on the Phase II project is female. The 
relative propensity of females to engage in entrepreneurial activity, and the recentness of that 
activity, has been extensively documented (Acs and Audretsch 2010). Thus, we would expect a 
negative coefficient between female principle investigators (FemalePI), and possibly female 
owners (FemaleOwn) – a firm variable discussed below – and the dependent variables.16 
However, to the extent to which women entrepreneurs are less protective of the ability to control 
(Fehr, Herz, and Wilkening 2010), the likelihood of partnering with a university could increase. 
The second category of project-specific independent variables reflects the relevant technology. 
Entrepreneurial opportunities are not assumed to be homogeneous across different technologies. 
Rather, Scherer (1983) observed that the propensity to innovate any given technology is, in fact, 
influenced by the commercial opportunities associated with that technology. Differences in 
entrepreneurial opportunities across technologies are accounted for by using a series of 
dichotomous variables, reflecting whether the funded research has or is expected to generate 
commercialized output that is software, hardware, or a process technology. Similarly, 
entrepreneurial opportunities may vary across the expected/actual commercialized outputs of 
service capabilities, research tools, educational material, and other outputs, so dichotomous 
variables are included. These controls are of particular interest for the potential light that they 
shed on financial market views of the riskiness and profitability of one line of research versus 
another. If, for example, financial markets view more tangible innovations (software, hardware, 
and research tools) as less risky and/or more profitable than intangible innovations (process 
technology, service capabilities, and educational products), we would expect the former group to 
be associated with a higher likelihood of university partnering. 
The third category of independent variables reflects characteristics specific to the firm, and in 
particular, to its owner. These variables indicate the ability of the firm to identify and act on 
entrepreneurial opportunities. A growing literature has identified the background and career 
trajectory of the founder as having a large influence on firm strategy and performance. The 
ability of the firm to recognize and act on entrepreneurial opportunities is enhanced when the 
founder has a business background. Similarly, a founder with an academic background might be 
expected to increase the propensity for the firm to partner with the university because the ability 
of the founder and firm to identify entrepreneurial opportunities emanating from research 
undertaken at the university is presumably higher. Link and Ruhm (2011) have argued that the 
background of an entrepreneur influences his/her firm's behavior. Background establishes 
blueprints that tend to become a stable element of the structure of the firm, and the structure of 
the firm guides its strategy, including partnering or not with a university. Viewed in the light of 
Fehr, Herz, and Wilkening (2010), a possible explanation as to why such entrepreneurial 
background is important is that it is connected to the degree to which the entrepreneur values 
control and on the degree to which the entrepreneur sees his/her interests as similar to that of a 
university. In the SBIR database, this dimension of the entrepreneur is quantified in terms of 
having either a business background (Bus) or an academic background (Acad),17 with a business 
background perhaps indicating a stronger desire for control and an academic background perhaps 
indicating a closer perceived alignment between the entrepreneur and a university. Additionally, 
a business background might be associated with the perception that the enterprise is less risky. 
To the extent these conjectures are true, a business background would have an ambiguous effect 
on the likelihood of partnering with a university, while an academic background would be 
associated with a greater likelihood of partnering with a university. 
Regarding other firm characteristics, we control for firm size by the level of employment (Emp) 
at the time of the Phase II award. On the one hand, larger firms may be less likely to partner with 
a university, holding constant the scope of the Phase II project, because they have a breadth of 
internal resources to draw upon to meet any uncertainties associated with the research. On the 
other hand, larger firms may be more likely to partner with a university, ceteris paribus, if 
associated with its size is specialization of its employees. Moreover, to the extent that a larger 
firm is viewed as a less risky venture, that too would result in the level of employment being 
positively associated with the likelihood of university partnering. 
3.4 Econometric findings 
The probit results from the estimation of Equation (8) are in Table 4.18 With respect to our focal 
dependent variable, Univ, the results in column (8) show that larger firms, measured in terms of 
number of employees at the time of the Phase II award (Emp) are more likely to be involved with 
a university. This finding is not inconsistent with our prior findings that larger firms have less 
fungible human capital or view that larger firms may be considered less risky. There is no 
statistical evidence that this size relationship is nonlinear. The results also show that 
entrepreneurs with an academic background (Acad) are, as conjectured, more likely to partner 
with a university than those with some other background. 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Probit regression results (n=92) (std. errors). 
Variables (1) Univ (2) UnivFaculty (3) UnivGA (4) UnivEqupt (5) UnivSub (6) UnivLicense (7) UnivDevelop 
Award −0.001 −0.0008 0.002 −0.002 −0.003 −0.004 −0.004 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)*** (0.060) (0.004) 
FemalePI 0.192 – −0.085 – 0.196 – 0.962 
  (0.715)   (0.716)   (0.862)   (0.847) 
Software 1.376 0.551 0.646 0.042 0.762 – 0.389 
  (0.532)* (0.482) (0.475)***** (0.581) (0.517)***   (0.790) 
Hardware 0.602 0.522 0.603 0.341 0.389 – −0.039 
  (0.412)**** (0.438) (0.391)**** (0.447) (0.469)   (0.646) 
ProcessTech 0.412 0.047 0.417 0.065 0.364 – 0.131 
  (0.341) (0.368) (0.347) (0.457) (0.450)   (0.652) 
ServiceCapab −0.115 −0.452 −0.109 −0.204 0.296 – 0.815 
  (0.413) (0.473) (0.433) (0.610) (0.523)   (0.730) 
Tool 0.858 0.573 0.292 0.813 0.940 7.374 – 
  (0.435)** (0.441) (0.470) (0.497) (0.451)** (1.269)*   
EducMat −1.378 – – – – – – 
  (0.937)****             
Other 0.209 0.120 – – – – 0.774 
Table 4. Probit regression results (n=92) (std. errors). 
Variables (1) Univ (2) UnivFaculty (3) UnivGA (4) UnivEqupt (5) UnivSub (6) UnivLicense (7) UnivDevelop 
  (0.674) (0.759)         (0.868) 
Emp 0.007 0.005 0.004 0.008 0.009 −0.075 0.003 
  (0.004)*** (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)**** (0.005)*** (1.142) (0.007) 
Bus −0.118 −0.223 0.460 0.691 −0.098 – – 
  (0.309) (0.339) (0.319)**** (0.413)*** (0.413)     
Acad 0.749 0.219 0.250 0.853 0.532 10.841 5.744 
  (0.342)** (0.011)** (0.351) (0.489)*** (0.348)**** (1.269)* (1.230)* 
FemaleOwn 0.576 0.706 0.438 1.092 1.236 – – 
  (0.800) (0.767) (0.723) (0.770)***** (0.815)****     
Intercept −0.920 −1.004 −3.234 −1.040 −0.220 −18.011 −4.680 
  (1.178) (1.218) (1.434)** (1.430) (1.318) (14.19) (1.23)* 
Log Likelihood −50.45 −41.81 −43.76 −28.41 −31.74 −3.53 −13.92 
Pseudo R 2 0.283 0.231 0.187 0.302 0.329 0.635 0.559 
Note: Variables that predict perfectly are omitted and noted by ‘–’. 
*Significant at 0.01-level or better. 
**Significant at 0.05-level. 
***Significant at 0.10-level. 
****Significant at 0.15-level. 
*****Significant at 0.20-level. 
We find no evidence that either the size of the SBIR award (Award) or gender (FemalePI or 
FemaleOwn) influence the likelihood of a research partnership, although our theoretical 
arguments were not conclusive for such a relationship. The exception (columns (4) and (5)) is 
that female-owned firms are more likely to enter a university research relationship to gain access 
to technical capital (i.e. equipment) or research capital (i.e. subcontract). This finding, although 
not predicted from our theoretical arguments might reflect the still infant research nature of firms 
owned by female entrepreneurs. 
Finally, we find that the expected outputs of software, hardware, and research tools are positively 
associated with greater university partnering, while the expected outputs of service capability 
and education products have a negative association. This is not inconsistent with financial 
markets perceptions of the value of these different lines of research. 
In our opinion, the most striking finding when the nature of the university partnership is 
disaggregated (columns (2)–(7)) is that the background of the entrepreneur is statistically 
significant in every specification. In particular, having an academic background is significantly 
and positively correlated with every dimension of the relationship (except that the positive 
coefficient in the graduate student equation in column (3) is not significant), thus suggesting a 
general willingness to exploit a variety of relationships with a university that finds its origins in a 
perception by the entrepreneur that his/her interests and the interests of the university are similar. 
For entrepreneurs with a business background, however, that flexibility is not present except for 
the use of graduate students and university equipment (columns (3) and (4)), thus suggesting less 
of a perceived alignment between the entrepreneur's interests and a university's interests and a 
greater premium placed on control. 
4. Discussion of the findings and conclusions 
Jump to section 
1. Introduction 
2. Model of the industry/university... 
3. Statistical analysis 
4. Discussion of the findings and conclusions 
One of the major economic challenges confronting the USA is a lack of competitiveness in many 
industries. Policies to enhance US competitiveness, particularly in knowledge-based industries 
focus on increasing the spillover of knowledge from universities to the private sector. However, 
to actualize such knowledge spillovers, public policy needs to identify and promote conduits of 
knowledge spillovers from the university to private firms. 
This paper has focused on a particular conduit of knowledge spillovers, namely partnerships 
between firms awarded a Phase II SBIR grant and universities. The propensity for an SBIR 
Phase II Award firm to partner with a university is linked to three types of factors – those 
involving the underlying technology, those involving the anticipated outputs, and those involving 
the firm and in particular the background of the founder. The empirical evidence provided in this 
paper suggests that all three of these factors influence the propensity of the firms to partner with 
a university. The likelihood of a firm entering into a partnership with a university is apparently 
greater for certain technologies, such as software and hardware, than for other technologies, such 
as process technologies. 
Similarly, the likelihood of a firm–university partnership existing is greater for certain 
anticipated outputs than for others. If the anticipated output is a research tool, the likelihood of 
the firm partnering with a university is greater. However, other anticipated outcomes, such as the 
commercialized output being a service capability, are not statistically linked to the existence of a 
university–firm partnership. 
The background of the founder of the firm is also linked to the likelihood of a firm–university 
partnership existing. If the founder has an academic background, there is a greater likelihood of 
the firm partnering with a university. Still, those founders with a business background do exhibit 
a greater propensity to partner with the university in more limited and specific ways, such as 
having a graduate student working on the Phase II research project, or using university facilities. 
Taken together, the results from the analyses presented in this paper suggest that partnerships 
between firms and a university may flourish as entrepreneurs from the universities become more 
prevalent. It may be that facilitating entrepreneurship from university scientists and researchers 
not only has a direct benefit in terms of increased entrepreneurial activity, but also may enhance 
the subsequent spillovers of knowledge from the university to private firms, ultimately fuelling 
innovation, growth, and competitiveness. 
Notes 
†This paper was prepared for presentation at the Workshop on Academic Entrepreneurship, 
Economic Competitiveness, Basque Institute of Competitiveness, San Sebastian, Spain, 8–9 
September 2011. 
Link and Tassey (1987) were among the first to emphasize this trend from an economic policy 
perspective. 
See Hagedoorn, Link, and Vonortas (2000) for review of the literature on research partnerships. 
An earlier version of this literature review is in Link and Wessner (2011). 
Hall's (2004) subsequent emphasis on industry/university research partnerships in the USA is on 
intellectual property. See also the role of intellectual property protection mechanisms in research 
partnerships, as discussed by Hertzfeld, Link, and Vonortas (2006). 
Schacht (2009) provides an excellent review of public policies to promote industry/university 
relationships. Her starting point is (p. 4): ‘The promotion of cooperative efforts among academia 
and industry is aimed at increasing the potential for the commercialization of technology’. To 
wit, legislation in the USA to promote such partnerships traces at least to public policy responses 
to the productivity slowdown in the early and late 1970s. Specifically, such initiatives included 
the Bayh–Dole Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-517), Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (P.L. 97-34), 
and the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-514). 
Cohen et al. (1998) provide a selective review of this literature, emphasizing the studies that 
have documented that university research enhances firms’ sales, R&D productivity, and 
patenting activity. See, Blumenthal et al. (1986); Jaffe (1989); Adams (1990); Berman (1990); 
Feller (1990); Mansfield (1991, 1992); Van de Ven (1993); Bonaccorsi and Piccaluga (1994); 
Klevorick et al. (1994); Zucker, Darby, and Armstrong (1994); Henderson, Jaffe, and 
Trajtenberg (1995); Mansfield and Lee (1996); Zeckhauser (1996); Campbell (1997); and 
Baldwin and Link (1998). Cockburn and Henderson (1997) show that it was important for 
innovative pharmaceutical firms to maintain ties to universities. Hall, Link, and Scott (2000, 
2003) suggest that perhaps such research ties with universities increase the ‘absorptive capacity’, 
in the sense of Cohen and Leventhal (1990), of innovative firms. 
See Leyden and Link (1992) and Burnham (1997). Link (1995) documented that one reason for 
the growth of Research Triangle Park in North Carolina was the desire of industrial research 
firms to locate near the triangle universities (University of North Carolina in Chapel Hill, North 
Carolina State University in Raleigh, and Duke University in Durham). 
See Berman (1990), Feller (1990), and Henderson, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (1995), and Siegel, 
Waldman, and Link (1999, 2003). 
Siegel, Waldman, and Link (1999, 2003) document that university administrators consider 
licensing and royalty revenues from industry as an important output from university technology 
transfer offices. 
Bercovitz and Feldman (2007), building on the conceptual advances of Pisano (1991) and 
Chesbrough (2003), refer to exploration and exploitation in the context of upstream university 
research alliances. 
By concave, we mean that that first derivative of the function is positive and the second 
derivative is negative. 
David, Hall, and Toole (2000) provide an insightful description of the R&D process from an 
investment perspective. 
David, Hall, and Toole (2000) provide a more complete treatment of the variety of factors that 
affect the level of R&D activity. 
For a more detailed discussion of the economic role of the SBIR program, see National Research 
Council (2008) and Link and Scott (2010). 
These six types of involvement are defined by the availability of data from the NRC survey and 
not by our perception of importance. 
The gender of the Phase II research project's PI (FemalePI) and the gender of the firm's owner 
(FemaleOwn) are also considered because of the SBIR program's emphasis on woman 
entrepreneurs. 
Subsumed in the intercept are those entrepreneurs whose background is other than business or 
academics. 
To test empirically for selection bias, we estimated the probability of response to the NRC 
survey as a function of the age of the project and the number of employees in the firm at the time 
of the survey (2005). We conjecture that older award recipients would be less likely to respond 
to the survey because of a loss of institutional memory, and the larger the firm the more likely it 
would respond because of available resources, ceteris paribus. While this was statistically the 
case, we could not reject the null hypothesis that the model of response and the model of 
university partnership are independent from one another (i.e. the correlation of the errors in the 
two models is not significantly different from zero). 
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